It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role in the rise of the Welfare State. However, using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending-and three alternative proxies for inequality -the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, and the share of non-family farms -, this paper shows that inequality did not favour the development of social policy between 1880 and 1933. On the contrary, social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more egalitarian, suggesting that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.
Introduction
According to standard theories on the political economy of redistribution, the higher is the income inequality, the greater are the political demands for redistribution.
The logic is simple and compelling. The poorer is the median voter the more willing he or she will be to support redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) . Also, the fight against inequality is often considered crucial for the early development of the welfare state. Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) , for example, consider that equality (along with socioeconomic security) is "the core of the welfare state" (p.9). And the constant references to the harsh conditions of life of the new industrial workers, industrial unemployment or child labour that we find in the literature on the historical origins of the welfare state -all this within a context of unprecedented economic growth-, seem to suggest that modern social policy was (at least partially) a response to (industrialization-led) inequality. 1 However, a rapid comparative glance on the early stages of the welfare state suggest that modern social policy was developed first in more egalitarian countries (like the Scandinavian ones or even Germany), and not in more unequal countries (like Spain or Portugal). Lindert (2004) calls this the Robin Hood paradox, as it seems that "it was in the poorer and more unequal national settings before World War II that the least was given to the poor" (p. 15).
Despite these apparent paradox and the (more or less explicit) references to inequality, there are no studies analysing the impact of inequality on the early stages of the welfare state from a quantitative and comparative perspective. The aim of this paper is to help filling in this gap by analysing econometrically the impact of inequality on the evolution of social policy in a sample of more than 20 countries over the timeperiod 1880-1933 . This may in turn contribute to today's debates about the relationship between inequality and redistribution, on which there is no consensus yet. As I said, the median voter theories maintain that redistribution increases with inequality. However, as is shown in the next section, recent papers point in the opposite direction and suggest that inequality has a negative impact on redistribution (Bénabou, 2000 (Bénabou, , 2005 Lindert, 2004; Barth and Moene, 2009 ).
Analysing the time-period 1880-1933 has also certain advantages when dealing with the problem of endogeneity in the relationship between inequality and redistribution. In studies on present economies, one possible way to avoid this endogeneity problem is using pre-tax inequality indicators but, still, the possibility that current inequality (even before taxes) is not related to past redistributive policies cannot be completely ruled out. Between 1880 and 1930, however, social policy was still in its infancy, so it is reasonable to think that inequality was still an exogenous variable (or at least much more exogenous than it is nowadays). Moreover, differences in social spending levels over those years were quite large, possibly larger than today.
For example, in 1930, social spending (as a percentage of GDP) in Germany was 10 times greater than in Spain and 8 times higher than in Italy. As for inequality, differences were also noticeable. Consequently, my sample includes countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal with high levels of inequality, and others, such as Norway or Denmark, which were much more egalitarian. 2 As a dependent variable of my analysis, I have used the series of social transfers estimated by Lindert, which cover the time-period 1880-1930 and are available for more than 20 countries. The main limitation of those social transfers data is that they 2 More detailed information on the definition of social spending and inequality can be found in the following sections.
only include tax-funded public social spending but not state-subsidized occupational insurance benefits. 3 This may restrict the analysis somewhat, at least in the case of many European countries where the rise of modern social policy was linked to occupational insurance. For that reason I have made a new estimation of social spending in 1930 and 1933 for 28 countries, which do include the benefits of statesubsidized occupational insurance. This is based on information coming from the surveys of social services published by the International Labour Office in the 1930s, except in the cases of Portugal, where the figures are from Valério (2001) , and Spain, which have been estimated by myself from public budget sources and the statistics of the Spanish National Institute of Social Insurance. Finally, as well as the aggregate volume of social spending, I have analysed the influence of inequality on specific social programmes (pensions, health, welfare), for both Lindert's social transfers and my social spending data. This has enabled a more detailed analysis. The results indicate that inequality is negatively correlated with both social transfers and my new estimation of social spending, and that this applies for both democratic and nondemocratic countries. Somehow, this means that unequal countries found themselves in a kind of inequality trap, since high levels of inequality were reinforced by ungenerous redistributive policies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes some of the main theories on the relationship between inequality and redistribution. In section 2, I present my new estimation of social spending and compare it with Lindert's series of social transfers. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the impact of inequality on social transfers and social spending, respectively. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Theories on inequality and redistribution
According to the median voter models, increased inequality leads to greater political demands for redistribution. The argument is straightforward. If the median voter income is below the mean income (i.e. if there are high inequality levels) and all the citizens have the right to vote, then a majority of voters (all those whose income is less than the mean) will support redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) . This same logic has also been used to explain why higher inequality is bad for economic growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) , for example, suggest that higher inequality translates into higher redistribution, which in turn discourages investment and economic growth. However, empirical evidence about the MeltzerRichard (MR) hypothesis is inconclusive. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) , for example, documented a negative relationship between inequality and economic growth, but they did not explicitly test the link between inequality and redistribution. The first empirical test of the MR hypothesis is a paper by Meltzer and Richards (1983) , who concluded that the evolution of government spending in the US was correlated to the ratio of the mean to the median income. Similarly, Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) observe a strong positive association between changes in market inequality and changes in redistribution in several OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Milanovic (2000) , meanwhile, has also found a positive correlation between inequality and redistribution. His results, however, indicate that the middle-income groups gain little or nothing from redistribution, suggesting that the MR hypothesis fails to explain the mechanism through which redistribution occurs.
On the other hand, comparative studies by Perotti (1994 Perotti ( , 1996 , Bassett et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2001) have provided empirical evidence suggesting that inequality not always leads to more redistribution. To explain this, Roemer (1998) has modelled an old leftist argument, suggesting that, besides redistribution, there are other dimensions in the political debate (such as debates on ethnic and religious issues, for example) that divide pro-redistribution voters. Yet, this means that when redistribution is placed at the centre of the electoral debate, we should still expect a positive association between inequality and redistribution (as the MR model predicts).
Other authors, by contrast, maintain that, far from increasing, redistribution decreases with inequality. Lindert (2004) calls this the Robin Hood paradox and says that support for redistribution does not depend on the gap between the median voter's income and the average earnings, but on the gap between the middle-income groups (who are electorally decisive) and the lower-income groups. If the gap between both groups is small enough, then the middle-income groups will probably be more empathetic towards the beneficiaries of social policy. They can even feel that they themselves may at some point become potential beneficiaries of social policy and, therefore, they will be more willing to support redistribution.
The model by Kristov et al. (1992) also helps to explain why inequality could have a negative effect on redistribution. According to these authors, an individual's political participation depends on his or her absolute level of income. This is because (absolute) poverty increases the time preference for present consumption and reduces any type of saving, including investment in political activities (whether in the form of time or money). Therefore, if inequality involves an increase in absolute poverty levels, then social groups more willing to support redistribution will be excluded from the political process, and the political pressure in favour of redistribution will lessen.
According to Bénabou (2000 Bénabou ( , 2005 , if there are market failures, then redistribution may generate efficiency gains. 4 These, in turn, can offset the cost of redistribution for a portion of those individuals who initially pay for it. In an egalitarian society, where the level of income of the wealthiest individuals is not much higher than the average, the cost of redistribution for the former will not be very high and will be easily offset by the efficiency gains. Consequently, resistance to redistributive policies will be low. By contrast, in a society with high inequality there will be a large number of sufficiently wealthy individuals for which the efficiency gains will not offset the cost of redistribution. As a result, political support for redistribution will be lower.
Moreover, Bénabou (2000 Bénabou ( , 2005 considers that, even in democratic countries, political power and influence depend on income levels, 5 so that the upper-income groups have more political influence than the lower-income groups. 6 This means that the decisive voter will not be the median voter but someone located at some point in the distribution above him/her. This reinforces the negative relationship between inequality and redistribution described above. Thus, in a context of low inequality, the consensus that favours redistribution will be strengthened by the fact that political power will also be fairly distributed. In a context of increasing inequality, however, the pressures against redistribution will be strengthened because the relative political power of the wealthiest will also be higher.
Finally, Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Rodrik (1999) maintain that macroeconomic stabilizations are usually delayed in countries with high levels of inequality. The reason is that they have greater difficulties in reaching a consensus on 4 A good example would be public investment in education, which finances the education of many students with no access to private credit, increases the provision of human capital and stimulates economic growth. 5 Using data from Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Bartels (2002) for the United States, Bénabou (2000) shows that the poorest and least educated individuals tend to vote less, contribute less to electoral campaigns (in economic terms), and participate less in time-intensive activities (such as writing to their Members of Congress, attending meetings or campaigning for their political choice). In addition, senators and congressmen are usually much more sensitive to the demands of higher-income groups. In developing countries, the bias in favour of higher-income groups is probably more acute due to practices such as votebuying, graft and outright intimidation. 6 Note that, according to Bénabou (2000 Bénabou ( , 2005 , political influence depends on the relative level of income and not on its absolute level. If political influence depended on absolute income, once a certain income threshold had been crossed there would be no inequality of power between rich and poor; and inequality would only be able to reduce the political power of the poor if it involved an increase in absolute poverty.
how the stabilization costs should be shared. Similarly, Berg and Sachs (1988) argue that countries with higher inequality have to renegotiate their foreign debt more frequently because they find it more difficult to stabilize their budget in the long term.
These theories do not explicitly refer to social policy. However, it seems reasonable to believe that countries with high inequality will also find it more difficult to reach agreements as to how social policy should be funded. In all likelihood, the redistributive implications of each funding alternative (basically direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions) will become more acute. If inequality is high, for example, the regressive character of indirect taxes will be more pronounced, and the opposition of the poorest will also be more intense. The same could apply to direct taxes, but the other way round: their progressive character will become more pronounced and the opposition of the wealthiest will also be greater.
Social protection indicators before 1930-33
What are the Social protection indicators available before 1930-33? The social transfers database, created by Lindert, is no doubt the most comprehensive that exists for the pre-World War II period. It provides information for over 20 different countries in 10-year intervals between 1880 and 1930 (1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930). 7 According to Lindert's definition, social transfers include tax-funded public provisions.
However, occupational insurance benefits (which were funded by public subsidies plus employers and employees contributions) are not included in the estimations because they do not imply redistribution through public-budgets. Only government subsidies to these occupational insurance funds are included, but not the final benefits paid by these programmes (Lindert, 1992 (Lindert, , 1994 . Neither are provisions for civil servants included.
Lindert considers these to be the result of the particular labour relationship existing between the State and its employees. Therefore they receive the same treatment as the private-collective insurance benefits that many companies offer their employees.
Finally, social transfers are classified by programme (pensions, health, and welfare and 7 The data is available on Lindert's website (http://lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu/index.cfm?employeeid=17 &currentNav=12). The information there is almost identical to that published in Lindert (1994) and the working-paper version (Lindert, 1992) , though with slight updating. However, several countries for which Lindert (1994) warned there were problems with the data do not appear in the latest online version. These problems may have arisen because there was no information on certain relevant explanatory variables (Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia), because they were not independent countries for most of the period (Ireland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland), or because the exact level of social spending was not known (Germany and Switzerland). Moreover, in earlier versions, the information for most of these countries referred only to 1930. To keep homogeneity, the mentioned countries have not been included in the next section's econometric analysis. Therefore the countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. unemployment), but this classification should be analysed with caution, because, as Lindert himself warned, it is difficult to be precise about the aim of many social programmes, which were often oriented towards the poor in general.
The definition of social transfers adopted by Lindert is aimed at capturing the impact of those social protection measures that implied redistribution via public budgets and were addressed to the population as a whole and not to specific groups (such as civil servants). However, the exclusion of occupational insurance benefits may seem more controversial. These played an important role in the configuration of modern social protection systems in many continental European countries, and have been the focus of much attention in a number of studies on the origins of the welfare state (such as Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981; Flora, 1983; Baldwin, 1990; and Hicks, 1999) . As Lynch (2006) points out, it seems that during the late 19 th century and early 20 th century, when modern social policy was being shaped, there were two alternative forms of public intervention: one based on citizens' rights, predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia, and another in which benefits focused on the needs of people with close ties to the labour market, predominant in continental Europe. In the former, the aim of social policy was to cover the gaps in private insurance and mutualaid programmes run by unions. Consequently, the State offered tax-funded noncontributory provisions for children, the sick and the elderly who had no private coverage. Examples in this regard are the Danish and the New Zealand pension laws of 1891 and 1898, respectively.
In the latter, the state took over private forms of social protection, whether imposing mandatory insurance or regulating voluntary insurance. In Germany, for example, the state established mandatory workplace-accident, sickness and old-age insurance in the 1880s. The cost of these programmes was borne by employers and employees, with more or less generous government subsidies depending on the programme. In other countries, instead of establishing compulsory insurance programmes, the state opted for subsidizing and regulating mutual-aid programmes run by unions. In Belgium, for example, the state started subsidizing voluntary sickness and old-age programmes in 1894 and 1900, respectively. France did the same in 1898 and 1900, respectively. Government regulations normally established benefit levels, premiums and qualifying conditions; and the degree of government control was considerable because public subsidies to unions and mutual-aid associations running these programmes were conditional to the acceptance of government regulations. Many of the countries that initially opted for regulating union programmes ended up imposing compulsory insurance programmes. However, in some countries, statesubsidized voluntary insurance became very important in terms of people insured Lewchuk 2003, Murray 2007). 8 After World War II, under the influence of the Beveridge report, many countries tried to universalize their social protection systems, extending coverage beyond workers with jobs or who were union members. In fact, many countries' current social security funds are the descendants of the former state-subsidized occupational insurance. It seems therefore interesting to analyse the determinants of spending on social protection including these occupational insurance provisions too (particularly in the case of continental European countries, where these programmes were predominant). Moreover, at least at the time of their creation, state-subsidized occupational insurance must have had far-reaching redistribution implications (although not via the public budget). These programmes were typically financed through public subsidies plus employers' and workers' contributions, and these insurance contributions meant an obvious expense for both employers and employees, so that each of those groups must have tried to impose the largest possible burden of cost on the other. In some cases, these fights over redistribution even put the introduction of state-subsidized occupational insurance in jeopardy. For example, one of the reasons why the French law of 1910 establishing mandatory occupational insurance failed was because workers refused to pay the mandatory contributions (Ashford, 1989) . Similarly, the Spanish Workers' Compulsory Retirement Act of 1919 only imposed the obligation to contribute on employers, precisely to avoid labour opposition (Elu, 2006). 9 With this in mind, I have made a new estimation of social spending levels in 1930 and 1933, which includes tax-funded benefits provided by the public authorities (typically public spending on health-care, poor-relief, unemployment, and noncontributory pensions) plus state-subsidized occupational insurance benefits, both mandatory and voluntary (basically workmen's compensation, pensions, sickness-leave and unemployment compensation). 10 The benefits for civil servants have not been included in the estimations; and provisions for workers in public companies have been included only when these workers were subject to general legislation on social protection and it was clear that those benefits were not the result of a private labour relationship with the public company. The sample incorporates 28 countries and the information comes from the reports on social protection published by the International Labour Office in 1933 and 1936, which distinguish between two types of social spending: spending on social security and spending on social assistance 11 . In the case of Portugal the information comes from Valério (2001) , while for Spain the information has been estimated directly from public budgets information, the Spanish statistical yearbooks and the reports and statistics of the Spanish National Institute of Social Insurance (Instituto Nacional de Previsión). For convenience, from now on the term social transfers will be used to refer to Lindert's estimations and the term social spending to refer to my alternative database 12 . Table 1 shows a comparison between the levels of social transfers estimated by Lindert for 1930 and my estimations of social spending for the same year. As expected, the levels of social spending are higher in my estimation, which includes statesubsidized occupational insurance benefits. Only in the cases of Finland and Yugoslavia, Lindert's figures are slightly higher than those presented here, which is probably explained by the fact that the sources used are not exactly the same. In some countries the difference between the two estimates is not very wide. For instance, my estimate for Ireland amounts to 4.48% of GDP as opposed to 3.87% in the case of Lindert's data. However, sometimes the difference is much bigger. For example, social spending in the UK in 1930 was 6.52% of GDP, according to my estimations, while according to Lindert's estimations it was just 2.32%. In the case of Czechoslovakia, my estimations of social spending are also much higher: 2.91% of GDP as opposed to 0.51%. specific legislation for each type of risk. The provisions of pure private insurance have not been included in the estimations. 11 The countries in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia. In some cases, the information for certain social spending items were not available for 1930 and 1933 but for other nearby years such as 1929, 1931 or 1934. 12 Table A .1 in the appendix shows my new estimates of social spending. If all the countries are ordered according to their level of generosity, no great differences can be seen, in the sense that the 10 most generous countries are still practically the same: basically the developed countries of north-west Europe plus Australia. The 10 least generous countries, those occupying the bottom half of Table 1, are also still practically the same. However, there are a few changes in their relative positions when state-subsidized occupational insurance benefits are included.
Germany's top position, for example, is more evident in the last column of the Table. Meanwhile the Scandinavian countries lose out to Great Britain and Australia, which move up into second and third position respectively. workmen's compensation. The second awarded disability pensions and also temporary incapacity benefits. However, it was impossible to distinguish between them.
Consequently they have all been grouped together under the pensions heading. Health spending includes health-care spending plus sickness and maternity leave benefits.
Finally, spending on welfare and unemployment includes family allowances, benefits for the unemployed, and the traditional poor-relief which was often given to the sick, the unemployed or the elderly without distinguishing between them.
The determinants of social transfers between 1880 and 1930
The aim of this section is to analyse the role of inequality in the early stages of social policy. The basic model to be estimated is given by Equation (1):
(1)
where REDIST is the level of redistribution, INEQ is the level of inequality, and Z is a group of variables that are normally included in comparative studies on the determinants of social policy. The series of social transfers estimated by Lindert is used, in this section, as an indicator of redistribution. As mentioned earlier, it covers the time-period 1880-1930; the information is available for 10-year intervals (1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930) and embraces 21 different countries. In the case of Spain the figures are my own and in the case of Portugal they come from Valério (2001) .
Three alternative variables that capture the distribution of income have been used as a proxy of inequality: the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, and the area of non-family farms as a percentage of the total farm area (for simplicity the share of non-family farms). According to Atkinson et al. (2009) the top income shares can have a considerable influence on the evolution of the Gini coefficient and therefore they would appear to be a reasonable indicator of inequality.
At first glance the top income shares should not be affected by endogeneity problems since these are based on information that captures pre-tax income levels. It also seems reasonable to think that the small and newly evolving welfare states of the late 19 th and early 20 th century did not have a big influence on top income shares. However, the main drawback of the top income shares, as a measure of inequality, is that they refer to a very small percentage of population. Consequently, they do not capture those income variations that occur in the lower part or the centre of the distribution. The data on the top income shares come from Atkinson et al. (2007) and, in the case of Portugal, from Guilera (2010) . Both sources provide information covering various percentages of the wealthiest population (the top 10%, 5%, 1% etc.). Here, the top 0.1% income share has been used because this was the band that offered the greatest number of observations, although the number is still small: 40 in the time-period 1880-1930 involving 14 countries. 13 The years available vary from country to country, although in most cases they are from the early decades of the 20th century. Given these limitations, I have complemented the analysis by including two additional proxies of inequality: the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage and the share of non-family farms.
Nevertheless, the results with the top income shares variable have also been reported to allow for comparisons.
The ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage is a measure of inequality that was initially proposed by Williamson (1997) . The underlying idea is that changes in this ratio reflect changes in the economic distance between the average citizen in the middle of the distribution and the low-income worker near the bottom of the distribution. Its advantage is that it provides a reasonable alternative to Gini coefficients in periods on which information is limited. Prados de la Escosura (2008), for example, has recently shown that, in 1850-1954 Spain, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage was closely correlated with the Gini coefficient. However, the main drawback of this ratio is that it does not capture income variations in the upper part and the center of the distribution. I have been able to gather information on the evolution of unskilled wages in 14 countries between 1880 and 1930. The data comes from a wide range of sources that are detailed in footnote 14. The information on the GDP per capita has been taken from Maddison. 14 Given my model, one possible concern regarding the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage is that this variable might be affected by endogeneity problems, because the unskilled wage might be affected by social programs. As is shown below, I have applied some endogeneity tests and there is no evidence suggesting that this indicator is significantly affected by endogeneity problems. Perhaps, this is because the social programs implemented in 1880-1933 were not big enough to affect market inequality in a significant way.
Lastly, I have also used the share of non-family farms as a proxy of inequality.
The information has been taken from Vanhanen (1997) , who defines a family farm as one that provides work for a maximum of four people, including family members. The size of family farms can therefore change over time and from one country to another, depending on the technology or weather conditions. The purpose of this criterion is to separate family farms from big farms worked by paid employees. Note that it is the share of non-family farms (the opposite of Vanhanen's share of family farms) that is used here, because the aim is to have an indicator of inequality, not equality.
Apparently, the share of non-family farms variable has the advantage of not being subject to problems of reverse causality, because there is no reason to think that social transfers had a direct influence on the distribution of land ownership. However, this indicator loses representativity as the industrialization process advances and agriculture loses weight in the economy. Even so, it appears to be a reasonable proxy, especially in a period such as the one analyzed here on which information is very limited and the agrarian sector was much more important than nowadays. In fact, this variable has been used in a number of earlier studies as a proxy for overall inequality (Vanhanen, 1997; Boix, 2003; Keefer and Knack, 2002; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994) .
Here, I have decided to keep this variable to make the exercise more robust and to 14 For Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, the wage information between 1880 and 1910 has been taken from Allen (2001) , while in 1920 and 1930 it comes from Scholliers (1995), Sicsic (1995) , Scholliers and Zamagni (1995) , Vermaas (1995) and Feinstein (1995) , respectively. Wages in 1920 and 1930 have been rescaled to make them equal to those from Allen (2001) in 1910. Wage data for Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States comes from the historical statistics of the respective country. For Sweden, wage information comes from Björklund and Stenlund (1995) . In the case of Spain, the information in 1880-1900 comes from Reher and Ballesteros (1995) , while in 1910-30 it comes from Vilar (2005) . In the case of Portugal, the data has been taken from Martins (1997) , and for Australia and New Zealand it comes from ILO (1938) and Mitchell (2003) . Information on New Zealand for 1880-1910, Australia for 1880-1900, and Portugal for 1920-30 is missing. Therefore the total number of available observations is 75. Most of my wage data refers to unskilled labor in the construction sector. On the other hand, between 1880 and 1930 there was a considerable variation in working hours. Therefore, to make the international comparison more informative, I have computed the annual disposable income of unskilled workers. To make the calculations working-hours data has been taken from Huberman and Minns (2007) . Next, nominal wages have been deflated by using Maddison (1991) The expected sign of the degree of democratization, however, is less clear than in the case of the level of GDP per capita and the ageing of population. Initially one might think that democracy should have a positive effect on social spending, since it guarantees the right to vote to lower-income groups and allows the existence of leftwing parties and workers' unions (Lindert, 1994; Hicks, 1999; Espuelas, 2012) . Mulligan et al. (2010) , however, maintain that social spending is mostly driven by economic and demographic factors and that democracy is not a key determinant of the development of social policy. Hence the expected sign of this variable is not clear. 15 Data on registered voters has been taken from the Bank's cross-national time-series database, completed with Mackie and Rose (1991) . When calculating my index of the extension of voting rights for countries and time-periods in which voting rights were limited to the male population, I have used the male population over 20 years old as the denominator. When voting rights were extended to women, then I have used the whole population over 20 years old. 16 I have also estimated the model: 1) taking the number of registered voters as a percentage of the population over 20 years old, and 2) including a dummy variable to control for the existence of democracy, and the results are very similar.
Results
The results of estimating the basic model given in equation (1), using my three alternative proxies of inequality, are shown in Table 2 . The estimation method used in the regressions is least squares with country random-effects. Particularly in the regressions in which the top income shares are used as a proxy of inequality the random-effects model is preferred to the fixed-effects model. Given the scant number of observations, the latter would have been very costly in terms of losing degrees of freedom. The Hausman test was applied and no evidence was found to reject the random-effects model. Following Niskanen (1971) , one might argue that once social programmes are established they have a tendency to grow by themselves (due to the aspirations of bureaucracy), giving rise to a kind of inertia effect. In other words, the growth of social transfers may be no more than the result of a simple time trend.
Similarly, one might argue that the evolution of social transfers depends on shocks occurring at specific moments, such as the impact of the World War I or the copycat effect that may have come about after the pioneering countries introduced the first social protection measures. To test both possibilities and give more robustness to the analysis, I have also estimated the model including a time trend (that should capture the inertia effect) and time fixed-effects (that should capture the influence of specific shocks). Finally, as in Lindert (1994) , the results of estimating a tobit model are also reported (columns 10 and 11), because the endogenous variable, the level of social transfers as a share of GDP, is partially censored. Particularly at the beginning of the time-period, there are several observations taking value zero. 17 17 The results of the tobit model with the top income shares variable are not reported because there is only one single censored observation. Notes: dependent variable is total social transfers as a % of GDP. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
As expected, the level of GDP per capita shows a positive impact on total social transfers. The coefficient of the ageing of population is also positive but it is only significant in 4 out of 12 regressions. As for the coefficient associated to the degree of democratization, it is also positive and significant in most of the regressions. This suggests that the advent of democracy and the subsequent incorporation of low-income groups into the political process stimulated the development of social policy.
Inequality, on the other hand, has a negative and significant effect, no matter whether it is approximated by the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP to the unskilled wage or the share of non-family farms. This is just the opposite of what would have been expected according to the median voter models. Moreover, the results hold when controlling for time fixed-effects and a time-trend, suggesting that the observed negative correlation is not the result of the passage of time or an inertia effect.
However, the main potential concern is that the results in table 2 might be biased because of the existence of endogeneity. On the one hand, both the top income shares and the ratio of the GDP to the unskilled wage might be influenced by (past) social transfers, which would lead to inverse causality and endogeneity problems. On the other hand, the share of non-family farms is less likely to be affected by current or past social transfers. However, its evolution is unlikely to be random. On the contrary, one might argue that the share of non-family farms is likely to diminish over time (because of the introduction of new technology, for example, allowing families to work bigger extensions of land without hiring employees).
To test for the existence of endogeneity, I have implemented the Durbin-WuHausman (DWH) specification test. The models tested are the specifications given in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 2. In the instrumental variable estimates, I have used the lagged values of social transfers and inequality as the instruments for inequality. The results of the DWH test are the following. In the case of the specification with the top income shares as a proxy of inequality the statistic associated to the DWH test is chisquared (1) = 1.59, which indicates that there is weak evidence against the null that the regressor is exogenous. This result, however, should be interpreted with caution because of the scant number of observations. In the case of the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, the statistic associated to the DWH test is chi-squared (1) = 0.21. Again, no evidence is found to reject the least squares model. As suggested before, these results seem to indicate that social programs of the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries were not big enough to affect market inequality in a significant way.
In the case of the share of non-family farms, however, there is evidence of endogeneity. The DWH-test statistic is chi-squared (1) = 6.03, which is significant at 5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. This means that the estimations with the share of non-family farms variable might be biased and inconsistent. In this context, the problem is to find a proper instrument, correlated with the share of non-family farms and uncorrelated with the disturbances. Since I do not have that instrument, here I report the results of the instrumental variable (IV) estimation of the basic equation given in (1), using the lagged values of the share of non-family farms and total social transfers as instruments. As is shown in Table 2b , the coefficients associated to the share of non-family farms in the IV estimates are similar in size to the coefficients of the least-squares estimates. And the sign remains negative and significant, which seems to confirm the previous results. However, this should be interpreted with caution, given the lack of a more exogenous regressor. Notes: dependent variable is total social transfers as a % of GDP. Instruments are: the lagged values of the share of nonfamily farms and of total social transfers *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
By contrast, the results obtained with the top incomes shares variable and the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage seem more reliable. It seems, therefore, that there is weak empirical support for the predictions of the median voter models. However, my sample includes both democratic and non-democratic countries,
and median voter models apply only to democratic countries. In order to strictly test the median voter hypothesis, the regressions of table 2 have been re-run adding a multiplicative variable (democracy * inequality). Thus the new estimation becomes: Notice that my democracy indicator is a continuous variable that ranges between 0 and 1 (where 1 means that the whole adult population is enfranchised), and that my inequality proxies grow with inequality. Therefore, if the predictions of the median voter models are correct, the new multiplicative variable should have a positive sign: the greater the inequality and the more democratic the political context, the greater the level of redistribution should be. However, the results of the econometric regressions do not seem to confirm this hypothesis. As is shown in Table 3 , the coefficient associated with the multiplicative variable is not significant in most of the regressions. This suggests that the impact of inequality, even in democracy, continues to be negative. The only exception is the regression of column 7 in which the interaction between democracy and inequality has appositive sign and is statistically significant.
The coefficient, however, is too small to compensate for the negative effect of inequality. Note: the democracy variable was dropped in regressions of columns 1 and 2 because multicolinearity problems were detected, after applying a VIF test. Multicoliniarity problems probably arose because of the scant number of observations in these regressions. No multicoliniarity problems were detected in the regressions in which the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage is used as a proxy of inequality and in the new top-income-shares regressions without the democracy variable. In the instrumental variable regression, the instruments used are the lagged values of the share of non-family farms and of total social transfers. Robust standard errors in parentheses for regressions in columns 1 to 6, *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
From equation (3) we can calculate the total marginal effect of inequality on social transfers under democracy. This would be:
Therefore, even in a situation of perfect democracy (where democracy = 1) the marginal effect of inequality would be negative (-0.172) . This means that inequality has a negative effect on social transfers in both democratic and non-democratic contexts.
The fact that there is a negative correlation between inequality and the development of social policy even in democracy is a particularly interesting result with important implications. Contrary to what many studies on the origins of the welfare state appear to implicitly suggest, inequality did not favour the development of social policy even in its initial stages (when the level of social transfers was really low and social needs were therefore greater than today). However, the fact that social spending is negatively correlated with inequality suggests that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, in the sense that inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.
If the social transfers are analysed by programme, the results are not very different from those obtained in the previous sections. However, some interesting extra details can be found. As is shown in Table 4 , the coefficients associated to my alternative proxies of inequality have a negative sign in all regressions, no matter whether the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage or the share of non-family farms are used as proxies of inequality. Notice, however, that the negative coefficient of inequality is only significant in the case of the pensions and health regressions. This suggests that inequality was an obstacle for the development of the more modern types of social programs (like pensions and health), while in the case of welfare (which in this time-period largely includes traditional poor-relief) the impact of inequality is not significant. In other words, it seems that, in more unequal countries, traditional welfare programs lasted longer as the predominant forms of social protection. in columns 1 to 6, estimation method is least squares with country random-effects. In columns 7 to 9, estimation method is instrumental variables. The instruments are the lagged values of the share of non-family farms and of social transfers. All the regressions include time-fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses for regressions in columns 1 to 6, *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
The determinants of social spending in 1930-33
As was seen earlier, in many countries the rise of the welfare state was closely linked to the development of state-subsidized occupational insurance programs. The aim of this section is to analyse whether the negative effect of inequality is maintained when the provisions of these programs are included in the analysis. Therefore, the new estimation of social spending presented in Section 3 has been used as the endogenous variable for the analysis. As before, I have used the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage and the share of non-family farms 18 as proxies of inequality. The estimation method is least squares and, given the low number of observations, it was considered best to include random effects instead of fixed effects since the latter would be very costly in terms of losing degrees of freedom. Also, some explanatory variables take the same value in 1930 as in 1933 because the information is only available for every 10 years or covers various years, and they therefore act as a quasi fixed-effect. As before, in the case of the regressions with the share of non-family farms, the estimation method is instrumental variables, using the share of non-family farms in 1920 as an instrument.
The rest of the explanatory variables are practically the same as in the previous section. The percentage of population over 65 has been used to capture the effect of the ageing of population. The data come from Lindert's website, except in the case of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, for which they have been taken from Mitchell (1998) . The percentage of registered voters over the adult population has again been used to measure the degree of democratization. In order to avoid possible distortions brought about by the impact of the Great Depression, instead of GDP per capita I have included the percentage of the working population in agriculture, which is a more stable indicator of economic development. The information comes from Mitchell (1998) , except for the USSR and Spain, for which it has been taken from Allen (2003) and Nicolau (2005) respectively.
Finally, in order to capture the effect of the economic cycle and, especially, to account for the impact of the Great Depression, the rate of economic growth during the previous five years (taken from Maddison) has also been included in the estimation.
As in the analysis of social transfers, firstly I estimated a model only with inequality and control variables (columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 5 ), and then I added the interaction between democracy and inequality (columns 2, 4 and 6). As can be seen in Table 5 , both the coefficient of the percentage of the working population in agriculture and the coefficient of percentage of population over 65 have the expected sign (negative and positive respectively) and are statistically significant. The growth rate of GDP per capita over the previous five years, however, is highly significant and has a negative sign, which indicates that social spending had a counter-cyclical behaviour, as would be expected in the context of the Great Depression. Notes: dependent variable is total social spending as a % of GDP. Estimation method in columns 1 to 4 is least squares with country random-effects. Estimation method in columns 5 and 6 is instrumental variables. In regressions 5 and 6, the sample is composed of 24 countries and two years (1930 and 1933) . This should lead to 48 observations but information on the share of non-family farms for 1920 is missing for some countries. In regressions 3 and 4 there are 18 countries included in the sample. And in regressions 1 and 2, only 16 countries are included because the information on top incomes is much more limited. A dummy variable for Germany is included in regressions 5 and 6, because according to the quartiles method that country is an outlier. Robust standard errors in brackets for regressions in columns 1 to 4. *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
The econometric results also confirm that inequality had a negative impact on the level of social spending when state-subsidized occupational insurance benefits are included in the analysis. Both the top income shares and the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage and the share of non-family farms have a negative sign and are significant in almost all the regressions. The only exception is the regression in column 2, where the interaction between democracy and the top income shares is included.
However, neither the variable democracy nor the interaction between inequality and democracy are significant in the regressions, which again suggests that even in democracy there is a negative correlation between inequality and social spending.
As in the previous section, I have also analysed the relationship between inequality and social spending programme by programme. The results are shown in Table 6 . As expected, it seems that the percentage of the working population in agriculture had a negative impact (although it is not significant in all regressions). The ageing of population had a positive and significant effect on pensions and health; and the GDP growth rate has a negative and significant sign, which again suggests that social spending was counter-cycle. The coefficient associated to the variable democracy, in contrast, is not statistically significant (it only shows a significant positive effect in column 4). Finally, the coefficient associated to the inequality variables has a negative sign in almost all regressions (the only exception is column 1). And it is statistically significant in the regressions where health and welfare and unemployment are the endogenous variables. Perhaps, this indicates that the response to increasing unemployment during the 1930s was faster in more egalitarian countries. In any case, it seems that inequality's effect on social spending is also negative when specific social programmes are analyzed. Therefore, again it seems that there is weak support for the median voter hypothesis. In summary, the findings of these section and the previous one suggest that, between 1880 and 1930-33, inequality had a rather negative influence on the development of social policy, regardless of whether we use social transfers or social spending as an indicator of redistribution, and regardless of whether we use the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, or the share of non-family farms as an indicator of inequality. This has some important implications for economic growth. According to Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) inequality is harmful to economic growth because it leads to higher redistribution and taxation. However, if my results are correct, these theories fail to identify the mechanisms through which inequality hampers economic growth (because inequality does not appear to result in higher redistribution, but the opposite). In fact,
there are a number of theories proposing alternative channels to explain why inequality is bad for economic growth. Bénabou (1996) , for example, considers that, if there are market failures, inequality hampers human capital accumulation and, therefore, economic growth. Perotti (1996) , meanwhile, suggests that inequality stimulates political violence, which, in turn, discourages investment. And Keefer and Knack (2002) maintain that inequality increases political polarization, provoking uncertainty on the protection of property rights and discouraging investment.
Conclusions
It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role during the early stages of the Welfare State. However, not many studies have tested this hypothesis from a quantitative and comparative perspective. In this paper, the impact of inequality on social policy between 1880 and 1930 has been analyzed, by using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending-and three alternative proxies of inequality -the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage and the share of non-family farms-. Although it might look counter-intuitive, the econometric outcomes show that inequality did not favour the development of social policy even in its early stages. Curiously, more egalitarian countries were also pioneers in the rise of the Welfare State. Somehow, this means that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, in the sense that inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.
There are at least three theoretical arguments to explain this apparent paradox.
1) In the median voter theories it is assumed that redistribution implies dead-weight
